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Mitchell: Criminal Procedure

SMILE! YOU'RE ON CANDID CAMERA: MEDIA
PRESENCE AND THE ExECUTION OF

WARRANTS
I.

INTRODUCTION

In two recent cases, the Fourth and Ninth Circuits split on whether law
enforcement officials violate the Fourth Amendment when they permit media
representatives to document the execution of warrants and, if so, whether the
officials are entitled to a defense of qualified immunity. In Wilson v. Layne' the
Fourth Circuit held that law enforcement officers were entitled to qualified
immunity because, at the time of the incident, it was not clearly established that
the media could not enter a private residence to observe and photograph the
execution of an arrest warrant.2 However, in Berger v. Hanlon3 the Ninth
Circuit held that law enforcement officials violated the Fourth Amendment4
when the media taped and recorded the execution of a search warrant.
Moreover, the Ninth Circuit ruled that the officials were not entitled to
qualified immunity because they could not have reasonably believed that their
conduct was lawful. 5 Because of the conflict between the circuits, the Supreme
Court granted review of both cases during the November 9, 1998 session. 6
This Note reviews Wilson andBergerand advocates aresolutionto the
conflict. Part II of this Note describes the two cases and identifies the differing
rationales adopted by the Fourth and Ninth Circuits. Part H presents a
framework and analysis for adjudicating this matter. Finally, this Note suggests
that the Supreme Court should resolve the conflict by finding that the officials
in both the Wilson and Bergercases violated the Fourth Amendment and were
not entitled to a defense of qualified immunity.
II.

BACKGROUND

A.

Wilson v. Layne

In Wilson federal and state law enforcement officials entered the home
of Charles and Geraldine Wilson during the early morning hours in April 1992
to execute an arrest warrant for the couple's son.7 An angry Mr. Wilson,

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

141 F.3d II1 (4th Cir.) (en bane), cert.granted, 119 S. Ct. 443 (1998).
Id. at 118-19.
129 F.3d 505 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. granted,119 S. Ct. 443 (1998).
Id. at510.
Id. at512.
Wilson v. Layne, 119 S. Ct. 443 (1998); Berger v. Hanlon, 119 S. Ct. 443 (1998).
Wilson, 141 F.3d at 113.
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dressed only in undergarments, met the intruding officials as they entered his
home." The officials ultimately wrestled Mr. Wilson to the floor as Mrs. Wilson
emerged dressed in a sheer nightgown.9 The Wilsons' son was not in the
home."
Newspaper reporters compounded the Wilsons' humiliation by
observing and photographing the entire sequence of events." Although two
newspaper reporters accompanied the officials, the warrant did not authorize
or mention the reporters' involvement. 2 The reporters' sole purpose was to
gathernewsworthy material as part of "atwo-week, news-gathering activity." 3
The Wilsons subsequently commenced an action against the officials
alleging various violations of their rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments. 4 Following a motion for summary judgment, the district court
dismissed claims regarding the use of excessive force and lack of probable
cause. 5 However, the district court held that the officials violated the Wilsons'
constitutional rights by permitting the reporters to enter the home without the
couple's consent.' 6 The
district court also rejected the officials' defense of
7
qualified immunity.
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's decision and
ruled that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity. 8 Specifically, the
Fourth Circuit determined that it was not clearly established in April 1992 that
law enforcement officials violate an individual's constitutional rights by
allowing the media to observe and photograph the execution of an arrest
warrant.' 9 The court did not address whether or not the officials' actions
20
actually violated the Fourth Amendment.
B.

Berger v. Hanlon

In Berger the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS)
received reports that Paul Berger had poisoned or shot eagles on his Montana
ranch. 2' After hearing about these allegations, Cable News Network, Inc.

8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. The warrant was specifically addressed to police officers and made no
mention of the media or others. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 113-14.
17. Id. at 114.
18. Id. at 118-19.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 118.
21. Bergerv. Hanlon, 129 F.3d 505,508 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. granted,119 S. Ct. 443
(1998).
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(CNN) entered into a written contract with the United States Attorney's Office
for the District of Montana to allow CNN to document the USFWS's execution
of a criminal search warrant once one had been issued.' By entering into this
agreement CNN sought to obtain footage for its environmental programs, and
the government sought to advertise its efforts in the fight against environmental
crime.'
One week after the government and CNN entered the contract, a
magistrate judge issued a search warrant that authorized the USFWS agents to
search the Bergers' ranch and structures.24 Interestingly, the warrant did not
include Bergers' homey'Furthermore, the government failed to disclose to the
magistrate any information about the contract with CNN and did not request
permission to document the execution.26
Prior to executing the warrant, law enforcement officials and the CNN
crew gathered on a road leading to the Bergers' ranch to discuss the search.'
CNN taped this gathering and continued to do so as a ten-vehicle caravan
approached the ranch.28 CNN mounted cameras on the exteriors and interiors
of the government vehicles, and one USFWS agent wore a hidden microphone
in order to transmit live audio to the CNN crew."
Mr. Berger intercepted the caravan and was informed by a USFWS
agent about the search warrant.' Mr. Berger then drove the agent back to the
house and allowed the agent to enter so the agent could explain the situation to
Mrs. Berger.3 The Bergers were never told that the agent was wearing a wire
or that the cameras belonged to CNN.32 CNN obtained audio and visual
recordings totaling more than eight hours.33
Following the search, Mr. Berger was found guilty on one
misdemeanor charge involving the improper use of a registered pesticide.34
Subsequently, the Bergers filed claims alleging violations of their constitutional
rights in connection with the search.35 However, the district court ruled that the
Bergers were collaterally estopped because the constitutionality of the search
had been litigated in the criminal proceeding against Mr. Berger.36
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's decision as

22. Id.

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id.
Id.
td.
Id. at 508-09.
Id. at 509.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 507.
Id.
Id.
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to the issue of whether the search was unreasonable because of CNN's
involvement, which was not raised in the criminal proceeding." The Ninth
Circuit held that the search was unreasonable because the joint action of the
federal officials and CNN served no legitimate law enforcement purpose, thus
violating the express language and intent of the Fourth Amendment."
Additionally, the Ninth Circuit held that the officials were not entitled to a
defense of qualified immunity."'
III.

ANALYSIS

Given the number of real-life police dramas on television, courts will
increasingly encounter instances in which law enforcement officials have
invited the media to partake in the execution of warrants. As Wilson andBerger
indicate, cases of this nature raise two critical issues. The first is whether law
enforcement officials violate the Fourth Amendment when they permit the
media to accompany them in order to observe and record the execution of
warrants. If this issue is answered in the affirmative, the second issue is
whether or not law enforcement officials are entitled to a defense of qualified
inmmunity.
A.

FourthAmendment

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported
by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.'
Pursuant to the Fourth Amendment, a search occurs when officials violate an
individual's subjective interest and the interest is one that society would accept
as "reasonable."' Forpurposes of the Wilson andBergercases, the expectation
of privacy in the home is the subjective interest. Therefore, in order for a search
to have occurred under the Fourth Amendment, the court must discern whether
society is prepared to accept the privacy interest asserted by the Wilsons and

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id. at 510.
Id.
Id.
U.S. CONs . amend. IV.
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
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Bergers.
Historically, the Fourth Amendment has been characterized as "an
American extension of the English tradition that a man's house [is] his
castle." ' Judge Frank supported the idea that one's castle should be protected
under the Fourth Amendment when he wrote:
A man can still control a small part of his
environment, his house; he can retreat
thence from outsiders, secure in the
knowledge that they cannot get at him
without disobeying the Constitution. That is
still a sizable hunk of liberty-worth
protecting from encroachment. A sane,
decent, civilized society must provide some
such oasis, some shelter from public
scrutiny, some insulated enclosure, some
enclave, some inviolate place which is a
man's castle. 43

The Supreme Court concurred with this proposition when it opined
that "[a]t the very core [of the Fourth Amendment] stands the right of a man to
retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental
intrusion." The Supreme Court later reaffirmed this view when it stated that
the "physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of
the Fourth Amendment is directed. 45
The historical underpinnings and the Supreme Court's Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence indicate that society is not only willing to accept but
has already accepted an expectation of privacy in the home. Because society
considers this privacy interest legitimate, a "search" has occurred in both
Wilson and Berger for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. Nevertheless, the
mere presence of a "search" is not determinative of whether or not law
enforcement officers violated the parties' Fourth Amendment rights. Instead,
this finding triggers the Fourth Amendment protections against "unreasonable
searches and seizures."' Therefore, a constitutional violation can occur only

42. William Cuddihy & B. Carmon Hardy, A Man's House Was Not His Castle:
Origins ofthe FourthAmendmentto the UnitedStates Constitution,37 WM. &MARYQ. 371,400

(1980).
43. United States v. On Lee, 193 F.2d 306, 315-16 (2d Cir. 1951) (Frank, J.,
dissenting) (footnote omitted).
44. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961).
45. United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972).
46. In order to trigger the Fourth Amendment protections against "unreasonable
searches and seizures," a court needs only to find conduct that equates to a search or seizure.
See, e.g., Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730,74748 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring) (explaining that
because searches and seizures implicate different interests they are independently regulated by
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if the requirements of the Fourth Amendment have not been satisfied.
In order to comply with the strictures of the Fourth Amendment, a
search must be executed pursuant to a valid search warrant or supported by a
narrow exception to the warrant clause.47 If neither requirement is satisfied, the
search is per se unreasonable and unconstitutional under the Fourth
Amendment.' Because a valid warrant was issued in both Wilson and Berger,
the searches conducted by the law enforcement officials cannot be
characterized as per se unreasonable and unconstitutional.
However, the actual execution of a valid warrant may render a search
unconstitutional. Pursuant to executing a valid warrant, law enforcement
officials are confined to those actions the warrant specifically authorizes.49
Nevertheless, law enforcement officials may employ some warrantless actions
only if they are impliedly authorized or reasonably necessary. In both Wilson
and Berger, the law enforcement officials engaged in activity outside the
express language of the warrants. In Wilson the warrant was addressed to police
officers and made no mention of the media.5 However, the officials allowed
reporters to participate in the execution of the arrest warrant.5 2 By doing so, the
officials violated the warrant's clear language. In Berger the warrant did not
authorize CNN to participate in executing the search warrant. 3 Moreover, in
obtaining the warrant, the Government knowingly withheld the fact that CNN
would participate in the search pursuant to a written contract between the two
parties.5 4
Clearly, in neither case was the media's presence reasonably necessary
for the warrant's execution. The media's presence simply did not further a
legitimate law enforcement purpose." The media representatives were present

the Fourth Amendment-searches implicate the right to personal privacy while seizures
implicate the right to possess property).
47. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443,477-78 (1971).
48. Id.
49. Bivens v. Six UnknownNamed Agents of Fed. Bureau ofNarcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
394 n.7 (1971) (indicating that "the Fourth Amendment confines an officer executing a search
warrant strictly within the bounds set by the warrant").
50. See Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705 (1981) (holding that a search
warrant for a home carried the implied authority to detain its occupants); Payton v. New York,
445 U.S. 573,602-03 (1980) (holding that an arrest warrant carries the implied authority to enter
a dwelling where the suspect lives if the person is thought to be inside).
51. Wilson v. Layne, 141 F.3d 111, 113 (4th Cir.) (en banc), cert.granted,119 S. Ct.
443 (1998).
52. Id.
53. Berger v. Hanlon, 129 F.3d 505, 508-09 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. granted,119 S. Ct.
443 (1998).
54. Id.
55. The idea that the media's presence must facilitate a legitimate law enforcement
purpose is supported by the following congressional language:
A search warrant may in all cases be served by any
of the officers mentioned in its direction or by an
officer authorized by law to serve such warrant, but
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at the execution of warrants with the sole intention of gathering information
exclusively for entertainment purposes. 6 And, in both instances, the law
enforcement officials knew about the media's commercial motives and
endeavors. 7 As Judge Mumaghan argued in his dissenting opinion in Wilson:
Police officers cannot justify exceeding
the clear bounds of a warrant by asserting
that their actions might fortuitously have
served some legitimate purpose despite
being designed with no such purpose in
mind. The reporters might also have helped
by carrying the warrant while the officers
handcuffed suspects, orby holding the door
open for an officer while he was carrying
contraband; but to uphold police actions
because of the potential for fortuitous
assistance, despite clearly not being
designed to serve law enforcement, would
make a mockery of the rule that an officer's
actions are limited to the scope authorized
by the warrant.58
Characterizing the officials' actions as impliedly authorized or
reasonably necessary would undermine the warrant's validity. The Fourth
Amendment's protection is premised on the fundamental idea that officials
obtain permission from a neutral decisionmaker via a warrant before invading
the privacy of an individual's home.59 Thus, if the media's presence is
reasonably necessary in the execution of a warrant, then officials may explain
so to the neutral decisionmaker. 60 In Wilson and Berger,the law enforcement

by no other person, except in aid of the officer on his
requiring it, he being present and acting in its
execution.
18 U.S.C. § 3105 (1994). In finding that a Fourth Amendment violation occurred when the
media participated in the execution of a search warrant, the Second Circuit reinforced its
decision with the statutory language and purpose of 18 U.S.C. § 3105. See Ayeni v. Mottola, 35
F.3d 680, 687 (2d Cir. 1994) (indicating that "[t]hough the statute is not determinative of the
scope of the Fourth Amendment, it provides some basis for giving content to the Amendment's
generalized standard of reasonableness").
56. Wilson, 141 F.3d at 113; Berger, 129 F.3d at 508.
57. Id.
58. Wilson, 141 F.3d at 126 (Mumaghan, J., dissenting).
59. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948).
60. See, e.g., Stack v. Killian, 96 F.3d 159, 163 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that the
presence of a television crew in executing a search warrant was constitutional because "the
warrant at issue authorized 'videotaping and photographing' during the execution of the
search").
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officers had ample opportunity to obtain authorization for the media's presence
via a warrant, but the officers chose not to do so. As a result, the officers
violated the Wilsons' andBergers' FourthAmendmentrights. A decision to the
contrary would permit "police unilaterally to invite a reporter or anyone else
to accompany them whenever entering a house, even if the warrant says
absolutely nothing about allowing other parties to enter, so long as their
presence might fortuitously produce some benefit to the police."'"
Moreover, the Supreme Court has asserted that law enforcement
officers must conduct searches "in a manner that minimizes unwarranted
' By inviting the media into the Wilsons' and
intrusions upon privacy."62
Bergers' homes, the law enforcement officials did not minimize the intrusions
upon the parties' right to privacy; rather, quite the opposite is true. In Wilson
the police permitted reporters to take pictures of the half-naked Wilsons, and
in Berger a CNN crew surreptitiously recorded a private conversation in the
Bergers' home. Clearly, less intrusive means could have been utilized to
execute the warrants.
B.

QualifiedImmunity

According to the Supreme Court, "government officials performing
discretionary functions, generally are shielded from liability for civil damages
insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known."63 As the
rule suggests, qualified immunity encompasses all officials except those who
are simply incompetent or those who "knowingly violate the law." '
Essentially, the rule serves to protect decisions made in gray areas by imposing
liability only when officials cross bright lines.65
For purposes of the Wilson and Bergercases, the qualified immunity
test focuses on two key words--"clearly established." In determining whether
an official's conduct crosses a bright line, courts consider the right to be
"clearly established" when it has "been authoritatively decided by the Supreme
Court, the appropriate United States Court of Appeals, or the highest court of
the state."' However, the constitutional right asserted by the Wilsons and

61. Wilson, 141 F.3d at 126 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting).
62. Andersen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 482 n.11 (1976).
63. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).

64. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986).
65. Maciariello v. Sumner, 973 F.2d 295, 298 (4th Cir. 1992).
66. Wallace v. King, 626 F.2d 1157, 1161 (4th Cir. 1980); see also Cullinan v.
Abramson, 128 F.3d 301, 311 (6th Cir. 1997) (stating that "in determining whether a right is
'clearly established' this court will not look beyond Supreme Court and Sixth Circuit
precedent"); Jenkins v. Talledega City Bd. ofEduc., 115 F.3d 821,826 n.4 (I1th Cir. 1997) (en
banc) (asserting that "the law can be 'clearly established' for qualified immunity purposes only
by decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, or the highest court
of the state where the case arose").
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Bergers has never been authoritatively decided by any court. Specifically, the
Wilsons and Bergers contend that the Fourth Amendment's protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures prohibits law enforcement officials from
residence in order to observe and
allowing the media to enter a private
67
document the execution of a warrant.
Despite the absence of authoritative law in this specific area, the
Supreme Court in Anderson v. Creighton68 articulated a test indicating when a
right may be considered clearly established. In Anderson a Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) agent along with other state and federal officials searched
the Creightons' home without a warrant.69 Agent Anderson believed a
suspected bank robber was in the home; however, the search proved
otherwise.7" Following the search, the Creightons sued Anderson alleging
Fourth Amendment violations and asserting a claim for money damages.7 1 The
district court granted Anderson's motion for summary judgment because the
undisputed facts indicated that probable cause existed to search the Creightons'
home and exigent circumstances justified the warrantless search.72
Nevertheless, the Eighth Circuit reversed because unresolved factual disputes
rendered the matter inappropriate for summary judgment.73 Moreover, the
Eighth Circuit asserted that Anderson's qualified immunity claim could not be
decided on summary judgment because the right protecting persons against
warrantless searches of the home was clearly established.74
In determining whether a right is clearly established, the Supreme
Court indicated that the test turns on the level of generality defining the right.75
If the right is drawn too broadly, qualified immunity is transformed into a rule
of pleading.7 6 For this reason, the Court asserted:
The contours of the right must be
sufficiently clear that a reasonable official
would understand that what he is doing
violates that right. This is not to say that an

67. Although some circuits have addressed the general issue regarding law
enforcement officials and the media, no court has gone so far as to recognize a specific right
against this particular kind of intrusion. Instead, these cases tend to focus on whether a
reasonable official would have known that the conduct in question offended the traditional
notions of the Fourth Amendment See, e.g., Parker v. Boyer, 93 F.3d 445,447 (8th Cir. 1996);
Buonocore v. Harris, 65 F.3d 347,353-57 (4th Cir. 1995); Ayeni v. Mottola, 35 F.3d 680,684-87
(2d Cir. 1994).
68. 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987).
69. Id. at 637.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 637-38.
74. Id. at 638.
75. Id. at 639.
76. Id.
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official action is protected by qualified
immunity unless the very action in question
has previously been held unlawful, but it is
to say that in the light of pre-existing law
the unlawfulness must be apparent.'
The Supreme Court determined that the Eighth Circuit misapplied
these principles when it relied on the general right asserted by the Creightons
in order to reverse Anderson's summaryjudgnent Instead, the Eighth Circuit
should have considered "the objective (albeit fact-specific) question whether
a reasonable officer could have believed Anderson's warrantless search to be
lawful, in light of clearly established law and the information the searching
officers possessed."79 The Supreme Court vacated the Eighth Circuit's
judgment and remanded the case. s
Therefore, in order to reach a determination as to whether the officials
violated a clearly established constitutional right in Wilson and Berger, the
preexisting law on the matter is decisive. In both cases, the preexisting law in
question revolves around the Fourth Amendments core values and protections.
As previously discussed, the Fourth Amendment serves to protect the privacy
of individuals-particularly the right to privacy in the home. Although the
exact right presented in Wilson andBergerdiffers from those rights considered
in previous cases concerning unreasonable searches and seizures, the
application and importance of the Fourth Amendment remains unchanged.
Prior to the decisions in Wilson and Berger,three circuits confronted
the issue of whether law enforcement officials are entitled to qualified
immunity when third parties participate in an execution of a warrant.8
Although none of the circuits found that any officials violated a clearly
established constitutional right, the Second and Fourth Circuits relied on the
Fourth Amendment's general principles to reject a defense of qualified

77. Id. at 640 (citation omitted); see also Pritchett v. Alford, 973 F.2d 307, 314 (4th
Cir. 1992).
The fact that an exact right allegedly violated has not
earlierbeen specifically recognized by any court does
not prevent a determination that it was nevertheless
"clearly established" for qualified immunity
purposes. "Clearly established" in this context
includes not only already specifically adjudicated
rights, but those manifestly included within more
general applications of the core constitutional
principle invoked.
Id. (citation omitted).
78. Creighton, 483 U.S. at 640.
79. Id. at 641.
80. Id. at 646.
81. Parker v. Boyer, 93 F.3d 445 (8th Cir. 1996); Buonocore v. Harris, 65 F.3d 347
(4th Cir. 1995); Ayeni v. Mottola, 35 F.3d 680 (2d Cir. 1994).
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immunity. The Eighth Circuit granted a defense of qualified immunity because
a clearly established constitutional right was not violated.
In Ayeni v. Mottola82 Special Agent Mottola received a warrant on
March 5, 1992, to search the Ayenis' apartment for evidence of credit card
fraud after a confidential informant notified officials about Mr. Ayeni's
activities.83 Six agents went to the Ayenis' apartment without a warrant and
proceeded to knock on the door and announce "they were police conducting an
investigation."" When Mrs. Ayeni answered the door, dressed only in a gown,
one agent
pushed her away, and two agents pushed the door, so they could
85
enter.
The agents immediately began searching the apartment.86 When Mrs.
Ayeni requested to see the warrant, an agent said they were waiting for "other
people" to bring it.87 About twenty-five minutes later, Agent Mottola arrived
with the warrant and a CBS television crew.88 Despite Mrs. Ayeni's objections,
the CBS crew taped and recorded images of Mrs. Ayeni and her son.89 The
CBS crew also obtained footage ofthe agents searching the Ayenis' apartment
and personal effects. 9° The Ayenis later brought suit against CBS, Mottola, and
other agents. 9' The district court denied Mottola's "motion to dismiss on
grounds of qualified immunity." An interlocutory appeal followed.'
The Second Circuit held that "an objectively reasonable officer [in
March 1992] could not have concluded that inviting a television crew-or any
third party not providing assistance to law enforcement-to participate in a
search was in accordance with Fourth Amendment requirements."'93 Despite the
absence of a clearly established rule forbidding the act, the Second Circuit
rejected a defense of qualified immunity.
It has long been established that the
objectives of the Fourth Amendment are to
preserve the right of privacy to the
maximum extent consistent with reasonable
exercise of law enforcement duties and that,
in the normal situations where warrants are
required, law enforcement officers'

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

35 F.3d 680 (2d Cir. 1994).
Id. at 683.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 684.
Id.
Id. at 686.
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invasion of the privacy of a home must be
grounded on either the express terms of a
warrant or the implied authority to take
reasonable law enforcement actions related
to the execution of the warrant. Mottola
exceeded well-established principles when
he brought into the Ayeni home persons
who were neither authorized by the warrant
to be there nor serving any legitimate law
enforcement purpose by being there. A
private home is not a soundstage for law
enforcement theatricals.94
The Second Circuit added that the unreasonableness of the conduct in question
was made even more unsavory under Fourth Amendment standards because it
failed not only to serve the legitimate needs of law enforcement, but the
conduct specifically sought to offend the Amendment's primary value of
protecting the right to privacy.'
In Buonocore v. Harris the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and
Firearms (ATF) received information that Buonocore possessed illegal and
unregistered firearms as well as property belonging to his employer.' On
November 24, 1992, Special Agent Harris of the ATF received a search
warrant for Buonocore's home.98 Harris, accompanied by other law
enforcement officers and a corporate security officer of Buonocore's employer,
executed the warrant that evening." Buonocore brought suit alleging various

94. Id.
95. Id.; see also Hagler v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 24 Media L. Rep. (BNA)
2332, 2334 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (adopting and quoting the reasoning of Ayeni). But see Bills v.
Aseltine, 52 F.3d 596, 602 (6th Cir. 1995) (rejecting Ayeni for failing "to define narrowly the
right allegedly violated, instead describing the violation in abstract and general terms").
Following the Ayeni decision, commentators recognized the consequences and need for a
uniform analysis-consistent with that advocatedby the Second Circuit-governing thepresence
of the media during the execution of warrants. See Elsa Y. Ransom, Home: No Placefor "Law
Enforcement Theatricals"-The Outlawing ofPoliceMediaHome Invasionsin Ayeni v. Mottola,
16 Loy. L.A. EN,
T.L.J. 325 (1995) (analyzing Ayeni and its effect on the media); Brad M.
Johnston, Note, The Media'sPresenceDuring the Execution of a Search Warrant: A PerSe
Violation of the FourthAmendment, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1499 (1997) (indicating why the Second
Circuit reached the correct decision in Ayeni); Kevin E. Lunday, Note, Permitting Media
ParticipationinFederalSearches: Exploringthe ConsequencesfortheUnitedStatesFollowing
Ayeni v. Mottola andaFrameworkforAnalysis,65 GEO. WASH.L. REV. 278 (1997) (discussing
the balance of interests presented in Ayeni and its consequences for federal officials).

96. 65 F.3d 347 (4th Cir. 1995).
97. Id. at 350.
98. Id. The warrant denoted that only Harris or another "authorized officer" could
perform the search. Id.
99. Id.
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causes of action."° The district court refused to grant Harris and a local deputy
summary judgment based on qualified immunity. 1°
On appeal the Fourth Circuit held that a federal officer violated the
Fourth Amendment and was not entitled to qualified immunity after allowing
an employee of a private corporation to attend an execution of warrant when
the employee acted exclusively for the corporation's benefit and did not aid the
officer." 2 In its opinion, the Fourth Circuit cited Ayeni with approval. 0 3
Furthermore, the court recognized that the Fourth Amendment guarantees
"[t]he right to be free from government officials facilitating a private person's
general search.""' Nevertheless, in deciding Wilson, the Fourth Circuitrejected
Buonocore on the ground that the same issue and right were not involved in the
two cases. 1°5 Specifically, the majority opinion reasoned that the officers in
Wilson did not allow the reporters to conduct their own independent search,
whereas the police in Buonocore permitted the employee to conduct an
independent search."
In Parkerv. Boyer °7 a reporter contacted the St. Louis police because
a St. Louis television station wanted to chronicle the department's fight against
illegal weapons. 8 At the time, the police were concentrating their efforts on
Travis Martin, a man who lived with Sandra and Dana Parker. 0 9 The
department invited the television station to ride along with Officer Boyer."'
After detaining Martin outside the Parkers' house, officers executed the search
warrant and allowed the television crew to document the event.' The Parkers
summary judgment for the
brought sundry claims, and the district court granted
2
Parkers on their Fourth Amendment claims."
On appeal the Eighth Circuit concluded that it was not "self-evident
that the police offend general [F]ourth-[A]mendment principles when they
allow members of the news media to enter someone's house during the
execution of a search warrant."' " 3 As a result, the court granted the officers a
defense ofqualified immunity because they did not violate a clearly established
right. 4 Moreover, the Eighth Circuit dismissed the rationales of Ayeni and

100. Id. at 351.
101. Id. at 352.
102. Id. at 356.
103. Id. at 356 n.7.
104. Id. at 357.
105. Wilson v. Layne, 141 F.3d 111, 116 n.6 (4th Cir.) (enbanc), cert.granted,119
S. Ct. 443 (1998).
106. Id.
107. 93 F.3d 445 (8th Cir. 1996).
108. Id. at 446.

109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 446-47.
Id. at 446.
Id. at 447.
Id.
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'...
Buonocore as "only the beginnings of a trend in the law..
In light of the scarce case law, the Fourth Amendment analysis
presented in Ayeni and Buonocore appears to be the most persuasive and
instructive. The officials in both the Wilson and Berger cases completely
disregarded the long-standing requirements ofthe Fourth Amendment because
the reporters' presence was not authorized by a warrant, nor was their presence
reasonably necessary for the execution of warrant. By merely examining the
history and the Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, any
reasonable officer would know that failure to meet either of these two
requirements renders a search per se unreasonable and unconstitutional.
More importantly, law enforcement officials should not be entitled to
qualified immunity simply because the facts of these two cases involved the
media-an area in which a case directly on point did not exist. By arguing that
the preexisting law concerning Fourth Amendment principles alone is not
sufficient, officials seek to disregard constitutional guarantees altogether,
thereby converting qualified immunity into absolute immunity. As a result, a
decision immunizing officials from liability could have far-reaching
ramifications in destroying the sanctity of the home and the right to privacy." 6
"[I]f ever the government need enter a private home, the home-and its

115. Id.Parkerhas been criticized because it is void ofany discussion regarding the
constitutional principles controlling the execution of warrants.
[The Eight Circuit] improperly ended its inquiry after
ascertaining that no case had explicitly identified
such a right at the time the officers conducted their
search. Instead, the court should have considered
whether an existing precedent falling along the
spectrum between the general Fourth Amendment
principles and a previous case on point clearly
established a constitutional right to be free from
media intrusion at the execution of a search.
Recent Case, I I0 HARv.L.REv. 1340, 1342 (1997). Other commentators have criticizedParker
because of the opinion's blatant disregard of the home and the right of privacy. "The Eighth
Circuit, on the issue of the sanctity of the home and the right of privacy, missed the mark. The
Eighth Circuit failed to address how the media's presence did not violate the right of privacy or
the sanctity of the home when granting Boyer qualified immunity." Johnston, supra note 95, at
1529-30.
116. Judge Murnaghan recognized this concern in his criticism of the majority
opinion in Wilson:
The majority goes much too far when it sanctions
unconsented-to public tours of private homes, with
photography allowed, under the guise of an arrest
warrant. After today, any police officer entering a
private home under a search or an arrest warrant may
bring along any observer as a bystander, even an
observer there only to serve his own commercial
purposes or to satisfy mere curiosity.
Wilson v. Layne, 141 F.3d 111, 132 (4th Cir.) (en bane) (Mumaghan, J., dissenting), cert.
granted, 119 S. Ct. 443 (1998).
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' 7
occupants-can be laid bare for all the vworld to see." "

IV.

CONCLUSION

Because of the current disarray in the case law and the growing
popularity of real-life police dramas, a resolution to the conflict presented by
Wilson and Berger is imperative. The United States Supreme Court has the
opportunity to issue that decision. First, the Supreme Court must decide
whether or not the actions involved in Wilson and Bergerviolate the Fourth
Amendment. Given the Fourth Amendment's cardinal principles, this issue
should be answered in the affirmative. Not only did the actions of law
enforcement officials in those cases exceed the bounds of the warrants, but the
execution of both warrants was unreasonable and failed to minimize the
intrusion upon the right of privacy in the home.
More importantly, by issuing an express decision on this issue, the
Court will prevent cases like Wilson and Berger from hinging on whether
officials should have known their conduct violated preexisting principles."'
Instead, a bright line test can be utilized because an authoritative decision by
the Supreme Court renders the right "clearly established" for qualified
immunity purposes. " 9 As a result, the lower courts will no longer have to treat
the issue of media presence during the execution of warrants as a gray area.
The actions of law enforcement officials will be adjudged uniformly and fairly.
Second, in finding a Fourth Amendment violation, the Supreme Court
must decide whether the officials are entitled to qualified immunity. Because
the conduct in Wilson and Berger was so repugnant to the clearly established
rights and ideals set forth in the Fourth Amendment, the officials should have
known that their actions violated the right to privacy in the home. In denying
a defense of qualified immunity, the Supreme Court can reaffirm the validity
of the warrant process and urge law enforcement officials to err on the side of
the Fourth Amendment.
Tracey L. Mitchell

117. Id.
11 8. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987).
119. Wallace v. King, 626 F.2d 1157, 1161 (4th Cir. 1980).

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

15

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 50, Iss. 4 [2020], Art. 8

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol50/iss4/8

16

